Critics have long faulted the wide-spread practice of trade promotions as wasteful. It has been estimated that this practice adds up to $100 billion worth of inventory to the distribution system. Yet, the practice continues. In this paper, we propose a price discrimination model of trade promotions. We show that in a distribution channel characterized by a dominant retailer, a manufacturer has incentives to price discriminate between the dominant retailer and smaller independents. While offering all retailers the same pricing policy, price discrimination can be implemented through trade promotions because they induce different inventoryordering behaviors on the part of retailers.
Introduction
According to the most recent estimate, consumer goods manufacturers in US spend about $85 billion on trade promotions amounting to 13% of sales. In comparison, consumer promotions account for 6%, and advertising and media spending only 4% of sales (Cannondale Associates 2002) . Although trade promotions are widely used by manufacturers, they are often seen as wasteful. For example, Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) argue that trade promotions impose severe administrative burdens on manufacturers and add huge inventory costs to distribution channels. 1
Many have asked the question that if trade promotions are indeed ine±cient, why are manufacturers still using them? A number of explanations have been proposed in the literature. It has been suggested that manufacturers face a Prisoners' Dilemma like situation { they have to o®er trade promotions, otherwise the competition will take business away from them (e.g., Drμ eze and Bell 2003) . Lal (1990) shows that national brand manufacturers could use trade promotions to limit the encroachment from a store brand. Lal, Little, and Villas-Boas (1996) suggest that allowing retailers to forward buy bene¯ts competing manufacturers since forward buying decreases the intensity of competition between manufacturers. Agrawal (1996) analyzes the role of brand loyalty in determining optimal advertising policy (defensive strategy to build brand loyalty) and trade promotion policy (o®ensive strategy to steal customers from competition).
In this paper, we o®er another explanation for trade promotions. Our explanation essentially establishes the price discrimination role of trade promotions in a channel context: manufacturers can use trade promotions to price discriminate between large retailers (e.g., chains) and small retailers (e.g., independents) by exploiting their di®erent inventory carrying costs. Blattberg, Eppen, and Lieberman (1981) have shown that retailers can take advantage of the di®erences in consumers' inventory carrying costs. In this paper we show that manufacturers can similarly take advantage of the di®erences in retailers' inventory holding costs to achieve price discrimination through trade 1 According to one estimate, $75-$100 billion worth of inventory is added into US distribution channel because of trade promotions. See Kahn and McAlister, 1997, page 21. promotions.
However, price discrimination in a channel context is not a straightforward extension of that in a non-channel context, as multiple channel members are now involved in pricing and inventory decisions. More importantly, this price discrimination explanation for trade promotions results in a number of interesting predictions that are consistent with some of the otherwise puzzling observations in the area of trade promotions. For example, the predictions from our analysis explain why:
1. Manufacturers schedule their trade promotions well ahead to make it possible for retailers to plan forward buying.
2. Trade promotions are observed for packaged goods but not for perishable goods (Sellers 1992) .
3. Chain stores are happier with trade promotions but independent and convenience stores not. 2 4. Manufacturers allow forward buying but forbid diverting.
5. Manufacturers are complaining much more about trade promotions in recent years.
We believe that our ability to explain all these in the context of a parsimonious model suggests that the model is potentially useful. More speci¯cally, in the context of a channel consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers, we show that a manufacturer can e®ectively price discriminate among retailers by o®ering trade promotions if retailers have di®erent inventory holding costs. The stores with lower holding costs and higher warehouse capacity (usually dominant retailers like chain stores and warehouse clubs) can bene¯t from forward buying. Interestingly, we further show that not only does the retailer with low holding costs bene¯t from trade promotions, but the retailer with high holding costs can also bene¯t from this practice. Indeed, social welfare can also increase.
Although we initially derive these results in a dominant retailer channel setting (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989), we show in the technical appendix accompanying this paper (available on the Website of this journal) that these results hold in a more general competitive channel setting also.
To the extent that a manufacturer can use trade promotions to price discriminate between retailers, Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985) is closely related to our study. However, our research di®ers from theirs. In their model, the retailers are not making pricing decisions. 3 We explicitly model retailers' pricing decisions over time. Our model therefore takes the Jeuland and Narasimhan's analysis to the next logical step. This generalization yields interesting insights. One of these insights is that trade promotions can alleviate the double marginalization problem by giving the leading retailer more incentives to charge a lower retail price. 4 5 In addition, the model allows us to make some testable predictions about the practice of trade promotions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the dominant retailer model. The analysis in Section 3 consists of two parts. The¯rst part outlines the benchmark case where the manufacturer is not allowed to o®er trade promotions and analyzes the manufacturer's incentives to price discriminate between a dominant retailer and the competitive fringe. The second part derives the manufacturer's optimal trade promotion strategies and the retailers' optimal pricing and inventory decisions. Section 4 derives a number of interesting predictions regarding the e®ect of trade promotions on the manufacturer's pro¯ts, retailers' pro¯ts, and social welfare. Section 5 relaxes some assumptions used in the model. We conclude with a summary in Section 6.
3 In Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985) , a seller could price discriminate between more intensely consuming and less intensely consuming customers by o®ering temporary price cuts. In order to make this section consistent with the rest of the paper, we are using \manufacturer" and \retailers" as in the rest of paper to represent the \seller" and \customers" in Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985) , respectively. We thank anonymous Reviewer 3 for the suggestion.
4 Double marginalization problem refers to the situation where the economic interests of upstream and downstream rms are not aligned such that the retail price facing end users is too high to maximize channel pro¯ts, as illustrated in Jeuland and Shugan (1983) . 5 Bruce, Desai and Staelin (2005) show that manufacturers of more durable products give deeper promotional discounts, which helps mitigate the double-marginalization problem. One of the di®erences between our research and theirs is that our research shows manufacturers can use trade promotions to alleviate double-marginalization through price discriminating between retailers. Their research shows that manufacturers selling a more durable product o®er a greater depth of trade promotions and therefore have a less sever double marginalization problem.
The Model
Consider a stylized channel where a manufacturer is selling a product through a dominant retailer (e.g., a chain store) and the competitive fringe (e.g., smaller independent retailers). The dominant retailer sets the retail price (p), and the competitive fringe takes the retail price as the market price (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989) . 6 We start with the dominant retailer model for three reasons.
First, the phenomenon of \power retailers" is a familiar scene in today's retailing landscape and large retailers are becoming increasingly dominant in the marketplace. 7 8 Second, large chains often assume the role of price leadership and exert pricing in°uence over smaller retailers (Raju and Zhang 2005) . Third, the dominant retailer model simpli¯es the expositions considerably. As we show in Technical Appendix, if we were to relax the key assumption of only the dominant retailer setting the retail price and introduce price competition, our conclusions will not change qualitatively. 9
The total market demand in each period is given by Q = a ¡ bp, where a > 0 and b > 0 are constants. The dominant retailer faces a downward-sloping demand function given by
(2.1)
6 Formally, the competitive fringe supplies at the quantity where the price equals the (rising) marginal cost. 7 In the grocery industry, for example, mass merchandisers, warehouse clubs, and chain stores account for 23% of total grocery sales in 2002, while that number was only 9% in 1995 (The McKinsey Quarterly 2003) . Furthermore, the number of grocery chain stores in the U.S. was 18,400 in 1980, accounting for 52.7% of the total number of grocery stores. By 2003, the number of chain stores has mushroomed to 21,560 accounting for 65.4% of the total number of grocery stores. In the meantime, the share of dollar sales for chain stores increases from about 60.2% to 82.7%. Not surprisingly, Independents shrank in number from 16,500 in 1980 to 11,421 in 2003 and their dollar sales percentage decreased from 39.8% to 17.3% (Progressive Grocer Annual Report 1981 , 2003 .
8 There are several recent papers studying how the emergence of dominant retailers a®ects the interactions between channel members. In a bargaining model, Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan (2006) show that manufacturers may bene¯t from the increase in retailer dominance since channel e±ciency can improve with dominant retailers gaining cost advantages. Geylani, Dukes, and Srinivasan (2005) show that a manufacturer has an incentive to engage in joint promotions and advertising with weaker retailers since the manufacturer gets a higher margin with weaker retailers than with dominant retailers, who has the power to dictate the wholesale price.
9 In some industries, small stores can form cooperatives such as buying clubs to get promotional discounts from manufacturers or can make purchases from a middle party like a wholesaler, who buys from manufacturers for many small stores. The former case can be analyzed using the competitive model in Technical Appendix TA. The current paper is limited in analyzing the later case since we do not model a wholesaler between the manufacturer and retailers.
The demand facing the competitive fringe in each period is correspondingly, 10
In this dominant retailer channel, the competitive fringe's demand is increasing in retail price p while the dominant retailer's is decreasing in p such that these two di®erent types of retailers do compete with each other. Figure 1 illustrates the demand functions at the retail level. We assume
2 in our analysis to avoid any corner solution. In this channel, all retailers incur a holding cost for any inventory carried from one period to the next. In practice, chain stores and warehouse clubs usually have lower inventory costs than independents. One reason could be a lower cost of capital. Further, chain stores and warehouse clubs also have higher inventory holding capacity and much more shelf space than independents, a big component of inventory holding costs, especially for food retailers (Blattberg, Eppen and Lieberman 1981) . Therefore, it is reasonable to assume a lower inventory holding cost for the dominant retailer. 11 We assume that the dominant retailer has a¯nite unit holding cost (0 · h 1 < 1)
10 It is worthy of noting that the competitive fringe in this paper is considered as a group of independents that is modeled as a single entity. Each independent in the competitive fringe is weak in terms of market power compared with the single dominant retailer. We thank anonymous Reviewer 3 for suggesting to make this point clear.
11 Further, in Appendix A we also show that the dominant retailer has more incentives than retailers in the competitive fringe to reduce unit holding cost rate, since the economic reward from a unit of reduction in holding and retailers in the competitive fringe have an in¯nite unit holding cost (h 2 = 1). It is important to note that the in¯nite inventory holding cost for a competitive fringe is only a simplifying assumption, and we relax the assumption in Technical Appendix where we allow a¯nite di®erence in the inventory holding costs between the dominant retailer and retailers from the competitive fringe. As the manufacturer's production costs do not a®ect our substantive conclusions, we set them equal to zero for simplicity.
Manufacturer's Decision Variables:
The manufacturer in our model announces a wholesale price w i for each period i within a pricing cycle consisting of N periods (i = 1; :::; N). 12 The length of the pricing cycle N is also a manufacturer decision variable. The manufacturer's objective is to maximize the average pro¯t per period within a pricing cycle. 13 Dominant Retailer's Decision Variables: Conditional on the manufacturer's decisions on the length of a pricing cycle (N) and the wholesale prices in each period within the cycle (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::; w N ), the dominant retailer sets the retail price p i for periods i = 1; 2; :::; N to maximize its total pro¯t in each pricing cycle. As the dominant retailer has a¯nite holding cost, some inventory may be carried from one period to the next if forward buying is pro¯table. Therefore, the dominant retailer also makes decisions on Q i;j d , the inventory the dominant retailer orders in period i and sells in period j, where i; j 2 f1; :::; Ng and i · j.
Competitive Fringe's Decision Variables: Retailers in the competitive fringe take p i as the market price in each period i. As the holding cost for these retailers is assumed to be in¯nite, they do not carry any inventory from one period to the next. Therefore, a retailer in the competitive fringe will buy the product from the manufacturer and sell to customers if w i · p i in period i.
cost rate is higher for the dominant retailer who makes forward buying than for the competitive fringe. Therefore, the dominant retailer will have a lower unit holding cost than the competitive fringe in the long run, which further validates our assumption.
12 In this paper, we are modeling o®-invoice trade promotions. 13 For an early proof for the equivalence between maximizing average pro¯t per period and maximizing total pro¯t as discount factor approaches zero, see Jewell (1963) . 
We summarize the timing of decisions in this channel in Figure 2 . The model speci¯ed above can result in a number of di®erent pricing outcomes. Figure 3 illustrates several possible optimal wholesale price schedules. We de¯ne trade promotions as temporary price discounts o®ered by the manufacturer to retailers. Therefore, all the schedules except Case (a) in Figure 3 could be viewed as trade promotion schedules. For instance, in Figure 3 (b), w 1 is the discounted wholesale price and w 2 is the regular wholesale price. If the manufacturer o®ers a low price in one period and charges higher and increasing prices for the following two periods as in 3(d), then w 1 and w 2 are both promotional wholesale prices and w 3 is the regular wholesale price. We will show that under some conditions, trade promotions can increase the manufacturer's pro¯ts as well as channel pro¯ts, even after accounting for the additional inventory costs that are added into the channel as a consequence of forward buying by the dominant retailer.
Manufacturer's Incentives to Price Discriminate between Retailers
If the manufacturer does not o®er trade promotions, i.e., that the wholesale price is constant over time, all retailers will order from the manufacturer in each period and none will carry any inventory from one period to the next. The optimal prices and pro¯ts are easy to determine, and we simply state these in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 If the manufacturer is restricted to o®ering a common time-invariant wholesale price to retailers, then the manufacturer will set its wholesale price at w s = Of course, a single wholesale price is sub-optimal for the manufacturer for two reasons. First, the competitive fringe is passive in setting the retail price in the channel, and it will meet the residual demand as long as the wholesale price it has to pay is less or equal to the retail price set by the dominant retailer. Thus, ideally, the manufacturer wants to be able to charge the competitive fringe a higher wholesale price equal to the retail price so as to take away all the pro¯ts from the competitive fringe. Second, the manufacturer must also be mindful of the \double marginalization" problem dissipating channel pro¯ts because of too high a retail price. As only the dominant retailer's marginal cost will determine the retail price, if possible the manufacturer ideally wants to charge a lower wholesale price only to the dominant retailer. Therefore, to alleviate the double marginalization problem, and to take advantage of the price following behavior in the channel, it is in the manufacturer's interest to price discriminate between the dominant retailer and the competitive fringe. However, charging di®erent wholesale prices to di®erent retailers who are competing in the same market is unlawful. The manufacturer must¯nd some other mechanisms to reap the bene¯ts of price discrimination. Trade promotions, or time-variant wholesale prices, is one such pricing mechanism.
Trade Promotions as A Mechanism to Price Discriminate
When the manufacturer o®ers trade promotions, it o®ers the same wholesale prices to all retailers.
Thus, nominally, the manufacturer does not price discriminate. However, as inventory holding costs di®er among retailers, not all retailers can take advantage of trade promotions to the same degree. The retailers in the competitive fringe do not carry any inventory from one period to the next, as their holding cost is assumed to be in¯nite (relaxed later). The dominant retailer nds it desirable to carry inventory acquired at the promotional wholesale price to those periods with higher wholesale prices, i.e. to forward buy, if its unit holding cost (0 · h 1 < 1) is low enough. Because it is more pro¯table to buy in promotional periods and carry inventory forward, the e®ective wholesale prices are lower for the dominant retailer than for the competitive fringe.
Thus, trade promotions enable the manufacturer to price discriminate.
In Lemma 2, we formalize this intuition, stating the manufacturer's and retailers' optimal strategies when trade promotions are o®ered in the channel.
Lemma 2 If the dominant retailer has a positive unit holding cost (0 < h 1 < 1), while the competitive fringe has an in¯nite unit holding cost (h 2 = 1), then the manufacturer will o®er the lowest wholesale price in the¯rst period and charge an increasing wholesale price in each of the following N ¡ 1 periods within any N -period pricing cycle. The promotional wholesale price w 1 in the¯rst period, the wholesale prices w i in the i th period (2 · i · N), the retail price p j
(1 · j · N), dominant retailer's sales Q dj in the j th period, competitive fringe's sales Q cj in the j th period, average sales per period Q h 1 , and the manufacturer's average pro¯t per period ¦ h 1 are respectively given by
and we also have unit acquisition cost increases at the rate of h 1 per period. 15 The manufacturer also raises the wholesale price by the same amount to take the surplus away from the competitive fringe. Thus, at any o®-promotion period, the dominant retailer prefers to lower its price in the current period to sell more, instead of carrying any inventory forward to the next period. The manufacturer charges a wholesale price equal to the retail price in period i (i = 2; :::; N) in order to get all surplus from the competitive fringe. To determine the length of pricing cycle N , the manufacturer solves the optimization problem:
The constraints w 1 + (i ¡ 1)h 1 · w i guarantee that the dominant retailer's e®ective unit acquisition cost of the items sold in period i = 2; :::; N is no higher than the wholesale price in the same period, so that the dominant retailer does not¯nd it worthwhile to purchase from the manufacturer in period i at the current wholesale price. As the dominant retailer's e®ective acquisition cost per unit is increasing at a faster rate (h 1 per period) than the wholesale price (
there is an upper limit for N beyond which it is not pro¯table for the dominant retailer to carry any inventory. The constraints thus provide an upper bound on the manufacturer's decision variable N . As the range for N is convex and compact, there always exists a solution to the optimization problem (3.3). Given the optimal N and the sequence of wholesale prices preannounced by the manufacturer, retailers will not carry any inventory from one pricing cycle to the next since the¯rst period in the next pricing cycle will be a promotional period again. The manufacturer's decisions on N and the sequence of wholesale prices in a pricing cycle will therefore not depend on its decisions in any other pricing cycles. In Appendix C, we show that the manufacturer's announcement of both the length of pricing cycles N and the sequence of wholesale prices is credible. The manufacturer has no incentive in any period within a pricing cycle to deviate from the preannounced N and wholesale prices. 16 This suggests that both the manufacturer's and retailers' behaviors are independent between pricing cycles.
It follows from the analysis above that the e®ective unit acquisition cost for the dominant retailer is lower than that for the competitive fringe in period i = 2; :::; N, or w 1 + h 1 (i ¡ 1) < w i for i = 2; :::; N. This leads to our¯rst Proposition.
Proposition 1
The manufacturer can use trade promotions to price discriminate between retailers who have di®erent inventory holding costs.
Proposition 1 formally suggests a new justi¯cation for trade promotions not previously recognized in the literature. While o®ering the same wholesale price to all retailers but varying it over time, the manufacturer can price discriminate between retailers who are competing in the same market, as long as the retailer(s) with high wholesale price sensitivity has lower unit inventory holding costs than the retailer(s) with low wholesale price sensitivity. Because of the ability to price discriminate, the manufacturer can pro¯t from trade promotions. This perhaps explains the paradoxical trend, as noted by Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames (1999) , that \at the peak of the tradepromotion controversy, manufacturers' pro¯ts increased at a fairly steady rate, whereas retailers' pro¯ts were stable at best.
Our analysis also sheds some light on why manufacturers typically \allow" forward buying, but vehemently oppose any \diversion". Our analysis suggests that forward buying makes pricediscrimination possible, but diversion weakens the price discrimination mechanism. Furthermore, Proposition 1 suggests that trade promotions could also alleviate the double marginalization problem. Therefore, the channel as a whole could bene¯t from such a practice because the manufacturer can induce the dominant retailer to set a lower retail price by charging the dominant retailer with a lower wholesale price | a lower retail price increases channel pro¯ts in a dyadic channel where the linear wholesale price contract is in use. Indeed, such bene¯ts can be substantial, as we will show through numerical analyses next.
E®ects of Trade Promotions
A preliminary examination of the value of the price discrimination explanation for trade promotions can be made based on its ability to explain how trade promotions are practiced. To this end, we conducted numerical analyses to show the possible e®ects of trade promotions on players' pro¯ts and social welfare. The results from the numerical analyses are limited in their generalizability, but su±cient to motivate potential explanations for: 1) why trade promotions are frequently observed for packaged goods but rarely observed for perishable goods; 2) why chain stores are happy with trade promotions but independent and convenience stores are not; and 3) why manufacturers started complaining about the e®ectiveness of trade promotions as retailers became larger. Table 1 lists the parameters used in the numerical study. We discuss our¯ndings in detail in the following subsections. Manufacturer's Incentives to O®er Trade Promotions: Intuitively, all else being equal, the manufacturer will be more willing to o®er trade promotions to retailers as a price discrimination mechanism if the dominant retailer has a lower unit holding cost. Furthermore, the incidence of suggests that one is less likely to observe trade promotions in product categories, such as produce and frozen foods, where the holding costs for these products are quite high and similar for both chain stores and independents. The easy-to-store items such as canned food or detergents, however, are expected to have more shipments on trade promotions.
Result 1 also suggests that the presence of a very dominant retailer (very low b 1 ) in a distribution channel is not conducive to the functioning of trade promotions as a price discrimination mechanism.
At any given inventory holding cost h 1 , the more dominant the dominant retailer is in a channel, the less likely the manufacturer will resort to trade promotions. This suggests that one is less likely to observe trade promotions in product categories such as toys and o±ce supplies where power retailers signi¯cantly dominate.
E®ects of Trade Promotions on Sales:
A lower h 1 can facilitate price discrimination through trade promotions. Sales are therefore expected to increase with a smaller h 1 . When the dominant retailer has a smaller b 1 or equivalently a larger demand share, the manufacturer will have a lower incentive to o®er trade promotions. When b 1 is small, the double marginalization problem is worse, and sales do not increase as much. Table 2 shows the percentage increase in the manufacturer's sales by using multiple wholesale prices as opposed to the sales by using single wholesale price, i.e.,
as shown in Lemma 1. This leads to the result below.
Result 2 Increase in average sales per period can decrease in the dominant retailer's holding cost h 1 given b 1 , and is increasing in the dominant retailer's price sensitivity parameter b 1 given h 1 . Table 2 suggest that when the manufacturer uses trade promotions to price discriminate between retailers, its sales can increase due to the reduced retail price, and such an increase is larger for a smaller h 1 and/or a larger b 1 . As shown in Accenture (2001) , 95% of the interviewed manufacturers cite \Increase Store Sales" as the top reason for trade promotions. 17
Result 2 and
Result 2 and Table 2 provide a potential rationale for such an almost unanimous citation from manufacturers about the reasons for trade promotions.
E®ects of Trade Promotions on Pro¯ts:
As a lower h 1 facilitates price discrimination through trade promotions, the manufacturer's pro¯ts are expected to increase with a smaller h 1 . 18 When 17 The 2004 ACNielsen Report on Trade Promotions shows similar result: the top three reasons for manufacturers to run trade promotions are \increase sales volume", \increase market share", and \maintain current volume" that together account for 83% of responses (ACNielsen 2004) .
18 Our numerical study shows that N is decreasing in h 1 and increasing in b 1 . the dominant retailer has a larger demand share (a smaller b 1 ), the pro¯tability of trade promotions for the manufacturer is decreasing, as there is less surplus the manufacturer could take from the competitive fringe through price discrimination. Table 3 shows the percentage increase in the manufacturer's pro¯t by using multiple wholesale prices as opposed to a single wholesale price, i.e., We can also examine how retailers' pro¯tability is a®ected by the same parameters h 1 and b 1 .
We summarize our results below.
Result 4 2 ), the manufacturer o®ers a higher promotional depth relative to the single-wholesale-price strategy (see Table 4 ) and the increase in the dominant retailer's average pro¯t from each sale as opposed to the single-wholesale-price strategy gets higher. However, for any p, its demand share is small for a large b 1 . The e®ect of a small demand share dominates the e®ect of a high average pro¯t from each sale and, therefore, the dominant retailer's pro¯t is low for a large b 1 . When b 1 is small (close to b), the dominant retailer has a large portion of demand, but the average pro¯t from each sale is small, as the manufacturer o®ers a higher w 1 . Thus, the dominant retailer's pro¯ts will again be small. Therefore, the dominant retailer's pro¯t is¯rst increasing, and then decreasing with b 1 .
The numerical study also suggests that the pricing cycle will be shorter (N is smaller) for a higher h 1 . As the¯rst period within a pricing cycle is the only period during which the retailers in the competitive fringe can make a pro¯t, they will have higher average pro¯ts with shorter pricing cycles, implying that the competitive fringe's pro¯t increases in h 1 . The competitive fringe gets the lowest pro¯t for intermediate values of b 1 and more pro¯ts for smaller and larger b 1 's as expected. Also note that for a large b 1 and a large h 1 , the competitive fringe could become better o® due to trade promotions. For a given b 1 , it is optimal for the manufacturer to choose a shorter pricing cycle when h 1 goes up. Thus, the promotional period 1, when the competitive fringe can get positive surplus, will occur more frequently as h 1 becomes larger and the competitive fringe becomes better o® as a result. For a given h 1 , the manufacturer will o®er a lower w 1 but will choose a longer pricing cycle when b 1 becomes larger. When b 1 is very large, the positive e®ect of a lower w 1 on the competitive fringe's pro¯ts will dominate the negative e®ect of a longer pricing cycle and the competitive fringe becomes better o®. Therefore, the competitive fringe's pro¯t is¯rst decreasing, and then increasing in b 1 .
E®ects of Trade Promotions on Social Welfare: Many researchers have argued that trade
promotions are harmful to a channel because of increased inventory holding costs. Although our model also suggests that trade promotions increase inventory holding costs, we¯nd that trade promotions can potentially bene¯t the system as a whole by enabling the manufacturer to price discriminate between retailers. We state this result formally below (Figure 7 in Technical Appendix TB veri¯es this result). Overall, what emerges from Proposition 1 and Results 1-5 is a di®erent perspective on trade promotions. Manufacturers embrace trade promotions because the practice allows them to implement price discrimination in a distribution channel. In light of this perspective, it is rather understandable that when manufacturers run trade promotions, they allow forward buying, but disallow diversion. Our model can also explain why retailers do not all endorse this practice.
The dominant retailer favors such a practice as it stands to bene¯t from trade promotions due to its low inventory holding costs. The competitive fringe could oppose such a practice, as it may become worse o® because of the e®ective price discrimination that trade promotions achieve. However, this does not mean that such a practice is harmful because social welfare can increase with this practice. Finally, manufacturers may have incentives to abandon this practice, as the retail consolidation continues. 19
Extensions
Our basic model leaves three important questions unanswered so far.
1. Does price-discrimination necessarily require multiple wholesale prices, as suggested by the solution to the optimization problem (3.3)? If it does, such a theory would be rather counterfactual, as in practice, we often observe manufacturers alternating between two wholesale prices in a given period of time: the regular and discounted wholesale prices.
2. Does a price discrimination explanation of trade promotions also hold in the situations where the competitive fringe has¯nite (as oppose to in¯nite) inventory holding costs?
3. Does the price discrimination explanation of trade promotions depend on the assumption of dominant retailer channel (i.e., only the dominant retailer has pricing power)? In other words, if the competitive fringe independently and competitively sets its retail price, would the manufacturer's incentives to use trade promotions to price discriminate go away?
Comparing 2-Price Model with the Full Model
In our basic model, as the optimal solution, the manufacturer's wholesale price increases every period, after the initial dip, over the rest of the pricing cycle. This feature of our solution is not necessary as two price points are su±cient for price discrimination to occur. In fact, there are three ways to reconcile our optimal solution with the frequently observed trade promotion practice of two price points. First, the parameters may be such that the optimal solution calls for a regular wholesale price and a discounted price. In other words, there is a possibility that a 2-price solution may indeed be optimal. Of course, such an explanation would be, admittedly, quite tenuous, given that our model does not o®er a way to restrict the parameter space.
Second, we show that using only two price points allows the manufacturer to price discriminate between the dominant retailer and competitive fringe e®ectively and to capture the bulk of the bene¯ts from trade promotions. When the manufacturer is \restricted" to adopt the two-wholesaleprice strategy only, all results under the multiple-wholesale-price strategy will hold! This means that this practice can also be justi¯ed based on the tradeo® between simplicity in administering trade promotions and pro¯t gains. As Table 5 shows, the pro¯t that the manufacturer sacri¯ces when switching from a regime of unconstrained multiple wholesale prices to a regime of constrained two wholesale prices is quite small (smaller than 1%). This implies that even with the minimalist approach of two price points, the manufacturer can reap substantial bene¯ts from trade promotions.
Finally, it is assumed that price changes are costless. In practice, cost of changing prices can be substantial, both in terms of monetary costs, and in terms of good will (Levy et al 1997) . When such a cost is considered, the manufacturer may want to use two price points.
Finite Inventory Holding Costs for Both Retailers
If the competitive fringe has a¯nite (as oppose to in¯nite in the basic model) unit inventory holding cost but such cost is still higher than the dominant retailer's, i.e., 0 < h 1 < h 2 < 1, the manufacturer can still use trade promotions to price discriminate. The proofs are in Technical Appendix. The price discrimination comes about because of the extent to which di®erent retailers can take advantage of trade promotions due to di®erences in holding costs.
Generalizing from the Dominant Retailer Model
Consider, for instance, an alternative demand model given by
where p i is the price for retailer i (Sayman et al 2002) . In Technical Appendix TA, we show that in this model the manufacturer can price discriminate between retailers through trade promotions, even if both retailers independently and simultaneously make pricing decisions, as long as minfb 1 ; b 2 g > maxfc 1 ; c 2 g. In other words, as long as the competing retailers exhibit di®erent price sensitivities with regard to the wholesale price, and the higher price-sensitivity retailer has a lower inventory holding cost, the manufacturer can bene¯t from price discrimination through trade promotions.
Conclusion and Discussion
Many researchers have argued that trade promotions are harmful to manufacturers and to the distribution channel because of the added inventory-holding costs. Using a dominant retailer model, we show that trade promotions can bene¯t manufacturers and the channel precisely because of the added inventory cost: these costs provide the manufacturers with an opportunity to price discriminate between a dominant retailer and the competitive fringe. We show that the price discriminating function of trade promotions is not speci¯c to the dominant retailer model and works for other competitive models also.
What this analysis implies is that manufacturers may want to proceed cautiously to \rein in" the practice of trade promotions. At the minimum, they need to weigh the bene¯t of pricediscrimination against any possible increase in the inventory and production costs in making such decisions.
The price discrimination perspective also sheds some new light on the practice of trade promotions. At a more general level, our analysis explains a few otherwise puzzling sets of practices associated with trade promotions: manufacturers do not seem to complain about the e®ectiveness of trade promotions or want to take the initiative of abandoning the practice (or when they do, they su®er); manufacturers allow forward buying but not diversion; power retailers urge for trade promotions but small and independent retailers frequently condemn the practice as unfair. Our analysis shows that price discrimination implemented through trade promotions could favor the manufacturer and the dominant retailer at the expense of the competitive fringe, and e®ective price discrimination can be implemented if there is forward buying but no diverting on the part of the dominant retailer.
Our analysis also shows that price discrimination induced through trade promotions can be welfare-enhancing as it alleviates the problem of double-marginalization in a distribution channel.
We also show that trade promotions can increase social welfare, as the di®erence between retailers' holding costs is su±ciently large or the dominant retailer's market share is su±ciently small (b 1 is large). Surprisingly, our analysis also¯nds that trade promotions may also bene¯t the competitive fringe under some conditions. The bene¯ts to the competitive fringe come during promotional periods, in which all retailers enjoy the low wholesale price. Thus, when the dominant retailer has a high holding cost h 1 and a low market share (large b 1 ), the manufacturer will promote frequently with a high promotion depth to the bene¯t of the competitive fringe.
Our analysis suggests that one is more likely to observe trade promotions in industries or product categories where inventory holding cost is su±ciently small, or power retailers are not too dominant. These are testable predictions.
One could argue that trade promotions as a price discrimination mechanism are potentially more e®ective and robust than other pricing mechanisms such as quantity discounts or a menu of two part tari®s (Kuksov and Pazgal 2007) . For instance, when a manufacturer uses quantity discounts to price discriminate against small retailers, the small retailers may be able to get together and pool their purchases to avail themselves of a low wholesale price. They can act similarly under a menu of two-part tari®s. However, with trade promotions, the competitive fringe retailers need to invest in joint warehouse facilities to be able to take advantage of periodic price deals. Said di®erently, as a price discrimination mechanism, trade promotions generate potentially less leakage than other posted price mechanisms.
While we believe that our analysis has generated some interesting new insights, it is important to point out the limitations of our model. In our model, we do not explicitly model product di®er-entiation, although a downward sloping demand curve for the dominant retailer does suggest some di®erentiation in its o®erings. If the retailers in the competitive fringe can o®er vertically di®er-entiated products to customers, we suspect that the competitive fringe will have more power and can be more pro¯table compared with the current model. 20 We do not consider the manufacturer's holding costs in the model. If the manufacturer has to hold inventory instead of transferring all inventory to retailers and has lower inventory holding costs than retailers, will trade promotions still bene¯t the channel? We suspect that trade promotions can still be bene¯cial as the motivation for and the e®ects of, price discrimination in a channel do not go away because of a lower inventory holding cost on the part of the manufacturer. We also assume that the manufacturer is selling a single product through retailers. In multiple product setting, studies on how trade promotions on one product a®ect the pro¯ts of other products may generate additional insights (Chen and Xie 2007) . Finally, we assume that the manufacturer is a monopoly in supplying products to retailers 20 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue. (Liu and Zhang 2006) . It is important for future research to investigate whether trade promotions could still help manufacturers to price discriminate between retailers in a competitive context. We suspect that they still could, as competition rarely negates any incentive for price discrimination.
Appendices

A. Retailers' Incentives To Reduce Holding Costs
Assume 0 < h 1 · h 2 < 1. The manufacturer will o®er a wholesale price w 1 in the¯rst period and w i in period i. Further, it will charge a w 1 and choose a pricing cycle length N such that the competitive fringe will not make \bridge-buying", otherwise the manufacturer will o®er a single wholesale price w s , instead of o®ering a trade promotion with both retailers making bridge-buying.
Intuitively, the dominant retailer, who is making \bridge buying", will have a larger incentive to reduce unit holding cost since the dominant retailer will reduce unit acquisition cost in each of the N periods. The competitive fringe, who has a unit holding cost h 2 > h 1 and is making \forward buying" for a shorter period than N, will have a smaller incentive since it will bene¯t from reduced holding cost in less than N periods. We will formally prove this result below.
Dominant retailer's incentives
Given w 1 and N , the dominant retailer will choose a retail price p i =
in period i and its e®ective unit acquisition cost in period i will be equal to w 1 + (i ¡ 1)h 1 , (i = 1; :::; N).
Therefore, the dominant retailer's pro¯t in period i is given by
and its total pro¯t in one pricing cycle is given by
The dominant retailer's incentive to reduce holding cost h 1 is therefore given by 21
That is, the dominant retailer's pro¯t will be higher as its holding cost h 1 goes down.
Competitive fringe's incentives
We have stated that the retailers in the competitive fringe are not making bridge-buying as the dominant retailer is. Otherwise, trade promotions will not be pro¯table for the manufacturer. However, the competitive fringe's non-in¯nity unit holding cost h 2 makes it probable for the competitive fringe to make forward-buying in the promotional period. Let ¹ x be the number of periods in which the competitive fringe's e®ective unit acquisition cost in period i = 1; :::; ¹ x is lower than the retail price p i , if the competitive fringe makes forward-buying in the¯rst period at the wholesale price
Knowing the competitive fringe's e®ective acquisition cost, the manufacturer will not charge the retailers in competitive fringe a wholesale price equal to p i in periods 1 to ¹ x, but charge them the e®ective unit acquisition cost w 1 + (i ¡ 1)h 2 to make competitive fringe retailers indi®erent between making forward-buying and ordering from the manufacturer in each period. Since the e®ective unit acquisition cost is not lower than the promotional price w 1 , the manufacturer could have higher pro¯ts by charging them the e®ective acquisition cost than announcing a wholesale price equal to the retail price in period i = 1; :::; ¹ x. Assume x makes the constraint equal
and we get x = 1 + a¡b 1 w 1 b 1 (2h 2 ¡h 1 ) . Therefore we have,
] and
Assume there are C identical retailers in the competitive fringe, each of whom has a demand proportion of 
The retailer's pro¯ts from period ¹ x + 1 to period N are zero because the manufacturer will take all surplus from the competitive fringe by charging a wholesale price slightly lower than the market price. So the total pro¯t within a pricing cycle for any retailer in competitive fringe is given by
The incentive for any retailer in the competitive fringe to reduce holding cost h 2 is given by
That is, the competitive fringe's pro¯t will be higher as the holding cost h 2 goes down.
Since ¹ x < N, equations (A.3) and (A.8) show that the dominant retailer has more incentives than any competitive fringe to reduce holding costs if the dominant retailer's demand (Q di ) is not smaller than the demand of any retailer in the competitive fringe (
B. Proof of Lemma 1. Conditional on wholesale price w s , the dominant retailer's pro¯t in any period is given by,
The F.O.C. of the pro¯t function determines the dominant retailer's optimal retail price, which is given by
and retailers' demands are given by
3)
The manufacturer chooses w s to maximize its pro¯t ¦ s = w s (Q d;s + Q c;s ). The optimal w s is given by
, it is easy to derive other results in the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. The way to prove Lemma 2 is to consider the dominant retailer's decisions in an arbitrary period based on e®ective unit acquisition cost. The dominant retailer purchases inventory in the¯rst period at a wholesale price w 1 and will be charged a unit holding cost h 1 > 0 per period for inventory it carries from one period to the next. Thus the e®ective unit acquisition cost of the units sold in period j = 1; :::; N is equal to w 1 + (j ¡ 1)h 1 . Here w 1 is the original purchase cost and (i ¡ 1)h 1 is the holding cost charged to each unit sold in period i. Therefore, the dominant retailer's pro¯t for period j is given by,
and it will choose a retail price p j = a+b 1 w 1 +b 1 h 1 (j¡1) 2b 1 in period j. Both the dominant retailer and the competitive fringe pay the promotional wholesale price w 1 in the¯rst period. From the second period on, the manufacturer will charge the competitive fringe a wholesale price equal to the retail price to get all surplus from the competitive fringe since the competitive fringe takes the retail price p j as given in any period j. That is, w j = p j for j = 2; :::; N. The manufacturer's average pro¯t per period in a pricing cycle is given below. B.6) where
is the retail price in period i, and w j = p j is the wholesale price in period j = 2; :::; N. Since ¦ h 1 is strictly concave in w 1 , F.O.C. solves w 1 as follows.
Other results in Lemma 2 can then be easily derived.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. If 0 · h 1 < h 2 = 1, the manufacturer will o®er wholesale prices w 1 and w i (i = 2; ::; N) as in equation (3.1). For items sold in the promotional period, both the dominant retailer and competitive fringe are having same unit acquisition cost w 1 . For items sold in period i = 2; :::; N, the unit acquisition cost for the dominant retailer is equal to w 1 + h 1 (i ¡ 1) and the cost for the competitive fringe is equal to the wholesale price in that period w i =
We have
> 0. Therefore, the competitive fringe is paying a higher average unit acquisition cost in a pricing cycle than the dominant retailer. If 0 · h 1 < h 2 < 1, the same logic still applies as long as the optimal pricing cycle length N¸2.
The only di®erence is that it is possible that the retailers in the competitive fringe would also like to carry some inventory from one period to the next, but they will carry items for fewer periods than the dominant retailer because of their higher inventory holding cost. If they are carrying items for the same periods as the dominant retailer, trade promotions will not be worthy for the manufacturer and the optimal N will be equal to 1, i.e., no trade promotions are o®ered. Q.E.D.
C. Credibility of Manufacturer's Announcement of N and w i (i = 1; :::; N )
In this section we will show that the manufacturer's announcement of both the length of pricing cycle N and the wholesale price w i for each period i within a pricing cycle consisting of N periods (i = 1; :::; N) are credible. That is, given the announced N and w i (i = 1; :::; N) determined as in Lemma 2, the manufacturer will not have incentives to deviate from them. The intuition is as follows. Given the preannounced optimal N, the manufacturer will not have incentive to extend N to anyÑ > N. The reason for the manufacturer to run trade promotions is because trade promotions will provide a higher average pro¯t per pricing cycle for the manufacturer than a time invariant wholesale price. If a manufacturer deviate from N toÑ > N and charge the optimal time invariant wholesale price w s as shown in Lemma 1 for periods N + 1; :::;Ñ (the dominant retailer's inventory ordered in period 1 will be depleted in period N ), the manufacturer will get a lower average pro¯t per period for periods N + 1; :::;Ñ . Given the preannounced N, the manufacturer will have no incentive to deviate to any ¹ N < N either. In a pricing cycle, the manufacturer gets a much lower pro¯t from units sold in period 1 than the average pro¯t per period in the pricing cycle since the wholesale price w 1 is low and available to both the dominant retailer and competitive fringe. In each period i (i = 2; :::; N), however, the manufacturer will get a higher than average pro¯t from units sold in the period. The higher than average pro¯t comes from the manufacturer's complete gain of competitive fringe's surplus by charging a wholesale price equal to retail price in each period. If the manufacturer deviates to any ¹ N < N, it will get a lower average pro¯t per period for each pricing cycle since the manufacturer is cutting o® the high pro¯t periods ¹ N +1; :::; N while the dominant retailer will bring unsold units (due to the truncation of the pricing cycle) to the next pricing cycle. The manufacturer will thus have no incentive to either extend or shorten a pricing cycle from N to any>N or ¹ N < N. In any period i = 2; :::; N, the manufacturer will have no incentive to deviate from the preannounced w i either. Since w i = p i for i = 2; :::; N, the manufacturer will not increase the wholesale price since such an increase will let the manufacturer lose the pro¯t from competitive fringe by making the wholesale price for the competitive fringe higher than the retail price. The manufacturer will also have no incentive to decrease wholesale price. If the reduced wholesale price in any period i = 2; :::; N (denoted as ¹ w i ) is so low that the dominant retailer¯nds it pro¯table to make an order, it is equivalent to the case where the manufacturer starts a new pricing cycle (equivalently, chooses an ¹ N < N), which is not optimal for the manufacturer as shown above. If the reduced wholesale price is not low enough to induce the dominant retailer to order in period i = 2; :::; N, the manufacturer will lose a margin of w i ¡ ¹ w i from competitive fringe, which is also not optimal. Either way, the manufacturer will not get a higher pro¯t by deviate from the preannounced w i . Thus, the manufacturer will not deviate from the preannounced N and w i (i = 1; :::; N). Now we will proceed the proof in the following steps. First, we will show that the manufacturer will not have incentives to deviate from the optimal N . Second, we will show that the manufacturer will not have incentives to deviate from wholesale price w i for each period i within a pricing cycle consisting of N periods (i = 1; :::; N), given the dominant retailer's order in the¯rst period
No Deviation from N Given both dominant retailer's and competitive fringe's decisions in Lemma 2, the manufacturer will not increase the length of pricing cycle from the optimal N to anyÑ for N <Ñ < 2N 22 . Suppose the manufacturer changes the length of pricing cycle from N toÑ after the dominant retailer makes its order in the¯rst period
It is then optimal for the manufacturer to set a wholesale price at w s = a(2b 1 ¡b) 2bb 1 for each period j (j = N + 1; N + 2; :::;Ñ ) and gets an average pro¯t per period of ¦ s = a 2 (2b 1 ¡b) 2 8bb 2 1 for periods N + 1; N + 2; :::;Ñ , if trade promotions are not used between periods N + 1 andÑ 23 . Since the reason for the manufacturer to provide trade promotions is because trade promotions will provide a higher average pro¯t to the manufacturer than a common time-invariant wholesale price to retailers, it is not optimal for the manufacturer to deviate from N to anyÑ > N. Now lets show the manufacturer also has no incentives to shorten N to any ¹ N < N. In order to prove so, we need the following lemma, which
shows that the manufacturer's pro¯t from sales in period N is the smallest among periods 2; :::; N.
22 IfÑ¸2N , then the focal periods we focus on will be from period i N ¢ N to periodÑ where i N = int[Ñ N ]. We will then get similar insights as in the case where N <Ñ < 2N . 23 An alternative way is for the manufacturer to use trade promotions to price discriminate between retailers between periods N + 1 andÑ , but such a shorter pricing cycle will be suboptimal compared with the optimal pricing cycle with a length of N since the optimal N is determined such that it pro¯t-dominates any other length of pricing cycle [please see Problem (3. 3)].
Lemma 3 In a pricing cycle, the manufacturer's pro¯t from sales in a period is the minimum in period j = minfN;
g among periods 2; :::; N.
Proof of Lemma 3. The sales in any period j = 2; :::; N consists of two parts -sales of the items the dominant retailer orders in period 1 at a wholesale price w 1 and carries to period j and sales of the items the¯rms in competitive fringe order from the manufacturer at a wholesale price w j and sell in period j. The sales in period j is equal to Q j = a ¡ bp j = 2ab 1 ¡ab¡bb 1 w 1 ¡bb 1 h 1 (j¡1) 2b 1 as shown in Lemma 2. Manufacturer's pro¯t from the sales in period j = 2; :::; N is thus given by
The derivatives of ¦ j h 1 with respect to j are given by
Since the twice derivative of ¦ from sales is the minimum in period j = minfN;
g among periods 2; :::; N, where
When the manufacturer o®ers trade promotions in period 1, the promotional wholesale price w 1 is same for both the dominant retailer and competitive fringe and w 1 is di®erent from the optimal constant wholesale price w s . Thus, the manufacturer's pro¯t from sales in period 1 is smaller than the average pro¯t under constant wholesale price ¦ s = a 2 (2b 1 ¡b) 2 8bb 2
1
. Since the reason for the manufacturer to o®er trade promotions in the current model is because of a higher average pro¯t in a pricing cycle than ¦ s , the manufacturer's pro¯t from items sold in period 1 is therefore smaller than the average pro¯t in a pricing cycle. Starting from period 2, the manufacturer will have to get a higher pro¯t from the items sold in each period than the average pro¯t in order to \compensate" the pro¯t \loss" in period 1. The higher than average pro¯t in each period comes from sales to competitive fringe at a wholesale price of w i = p i . Such a \compensation" process continues until a period when the pro¯t from that period is no longer contributable to improving the average pro¯t per period in a pricing cycle, i.e. the average pro¯t in that period is smaller than the average pro¯t in a pricing cycle 24 25 . Thus the manufacturer will have no incentive to \cut"
24 Numerical study shows that within the wide parametric ranges d¦ j h 1 dj is negative for j = N . That is, the manufacturer's average pro¯t in each period among periods 2; :::; N is decreasing in j for the studied parametric values.
25 The manufacturer's pro¯t from items sold in period i by both retailers instead of its pro¯t from items sold in period i by competitive fringe only should be considered here. This is because if the manufacturer truncates a pricing cycle at period i then the items that could have been sold by the dominant retailer in period i will be carried over to the \new" pricing cycle in an in¯nitely repeated game. at any period i for 2 < i < N since such a cutting will let the manufacturer lose the high margin in period i associated with the order from competitive fringe and, at the same time, orders from the dominant retailer will not increase because any orders unsold due to the \cutting" will not be absorbed by the dominant retailer but be carried over to and sold in the new pricing cycle. This will generate a smaller average pro¯t per period in a pricing cycle. g with the lowest average pro¯t among periods 2; :::; N has a higher than average pro¯t. That is, the announcement of optimal N is credible and self-enforcing -the manufacturer will not deviate to anyÑ > N or ¹ N < N in any period i = 2; :::; N within a pricing cycle.
No Deviation from w i
In this subsection, we will show that the manufacturer will not deviate from pre-announced wholesale price w i in any period within a pricing cycle.
With the announced sequence of wholesale prices w i (i = 1; :::; N), the manufacturer will charge the lowest wholesale price in period 1 in order to induce the dominant retailer to make forwardbuying. From period 2 until period N, the manufacturer will charge a wholesale price equal to retail price in each period in order to take full surplus from competitive fringe. In any period i = 2; :::; N, the manufacturer will not increase the wholesale price w i to any larger price since such an increase will make the wholesale price higher than the retail price and thus the manufacturer will lose sales from competitive fringe. The margin with the dominant retailer, at the same time, does not improve because there is no sales to the dominant retailer in any period except in period 1 in a pricing cycle.
The manufacturer will also have no incentive to lower the wholesale price w i in any period i = 2; :::; N. Suppose the manufacturer sets a wholesale price ¹ w i < w i in period i. One of the following two consequences will happen. In the¯rst consequence, the new wholesale price is not low enough so the dominant retailer will keep selling inventory carried over from period 1, i.e.
¹ w i¸w1 + h 1 (i ¡ 1). Such a decrease will then only decrease the manufacturer's pro¯t since the margin the manufacturer gets from orders from competitive fringe is smaller while sales do not change at all. In the other consequence, the new wholesale price makes it more pro¯table for the dominant retailer to order from the manufacturer in period i, i.e. ¹ w i < w 1 + h 1 (i ¡ 1). This is essentially same as the case where the manufacturer restarts a new pricing cycle. As shown above that it is not optimal for the manufacturer to deviate from the pre-announced N to any ¹ N < N, the manufacturer will not decrease wholesale price from w i to any ¹ w i < w 1 + h 1 (i ¡ 1) in period i = 2; :::; N.
Therefore, the manufacturer's announcements of both the length of pricing cycle N and the sequence of wholesale prices w i , i = 1; :::; N, are credible and self-enforcing. Q.E.D.
